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What was God’s involvement in the horrific event? 
 
This question naturally arises in the minds of victims and their supporters alike – be 
the event terrorism as at the London Bridge attack of 2017, or disastrous negligence 
as at the fire at Grenfell Tower in the same year, or a great natural disaster such as 
the Indian Ocean tsunami of 2004. Two famous responses to that question, both as 
it happens in response to human cruelty that caused great suffering, are first, that of 
Elie Wiesel in his concentration camp recollections in Night:  
 
“Then the march past [the victims hanged by the SS] began. The two men 
were no longer alive. Their tongues hung swollen, blue-tinged. But the third 
rope was still moving; being so light, the child was still alive… 
For more than half an hour he stayed there, struggling between life and death, 
dying in slow agony under our eyes. And we had to look him full in the face. 
He was still alive when I passed in front of him. His tongue was still red, his 
eyes were not yet glazed. 
Behind me, I heard the same man asking: 
"Where is God now?" 
And I heard a voice within me answer him: 
"Where is He? He is here – He is hanging here on this gallows..."1 
 
Second, Rowan Williams’ response to being challenged in a New York street at the 
time of the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center: 
 
What do you say? The usual fumbling about how God doesn’t intervene, 
which sounds like a lame apology for some kind of ‘policy’ on God’s part, a 
policy exposed as heartless in the face of such suffering. Something about 
how God is there in the sacrificial work of the rescuers, in the risks they 
take?... Any really outrageous human action tests to the limit our careful 
theological principles about God’s refusal to interfere with created freedom. 
That God has made a world into which he doesn’t casually step in [sic] to 
solve problems is fairly central to a lot of Christian faith. He has made the 
world so that evil choices can’t just be frustrated or aborted... They have to be 
confronted, suffered, taken forward, healed in the complex process of human 
history, always in collaboration with what we do and say and pray. 2 
 
1 Elie Wiesel, Night transl. Stella Rodway (New York: Bantam, 1982), 61-2. 
2 Rowan Williams, Writing in the Dust: Reflection on 11th September and Its 
Aftermath (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 2002), 7-8. 
 
Williams’ interlocutor ‘was a lifelong Christian believer, but for the first time it came 
home to him that he might be committed to a God who could seem useless in a 
crisis.’3  
 
In both cases the response stems from a profound spiritual reflex in a deep thinker. 
But it necessarily begs the question – why is the God who is confessed as present 
seemingly so powerless to prevent cruelty inflicting great suffering? 
A very tempting explanation, arrived at independently by two important Jewish 
thinkers, is that God cannot effect any change in such situations. God, for whatever 
reason, has entrusted Godself to humanity. Hans Jonas, whose mother died in 
Auschwitz, took the view that God empties Godself of mind and power in giving the 
creation its existence, and then allows the interplay of chance and natural law to take 
its course. God’s only further involvement is that God holds a memory of the 
experience of the creation – God receives God's being back ‘transfigured or possibly 
disfigured by the chance harvest of unforeseeable temporal experience’.4 
For a more first-hand, up-close theological response to Nazi tyranny, we may turn to 
Etty Hillesum, the young Dutch intellectual, whose diaries and letters in the last two 
years of her life (1941-3) have had such an impact on so many readers (helped for 
English speakers by Patrick Woodhouse’s sympathetic study Etty Hillesum: A Life 
Transformed).5 Etty comes to conclude that God will not, cannot, help those in the 
camp. All they can do is ‘safeguard that little piece of You, God, in ourselves’.6 Her 
God has handed Godself over to the world, entering the human heart, and being 
‘guarded’ by those with the least worldly power. She writes: ‘there must be someone 
to live through it all and bear witness to the fact that God lived, even in these times’.7 
Her concern is ‘if we just care enough, God is in safe hands with us despite 
everything’.8 
Such strategies for characterising God as vulnerable co-victim emerged with great 
integrity out of reflection on intolerable suffering. But they seem a far cry from the 
more usual confession of God as transcendent creator. This chapter considers 
communities’ possible answers to questions of God’s involvement in shock events, if 
those strategies, based on God’s voluntary self-disempowerment, are not adopted. 
 
3 Ibid, 8. 
4 Hans Jonas, Moratlity and Morality: A Search for the Good after Auschwitz – A 
(Posthumous) Collection of Essays edited by Lawrence Vogel (Evanston, IL: 
Northwestern University Press, 1996), 125. 
5 Patrick Woodhouse, Etty Hillesum: A Life Transformed (London: Bloomsbury, 
2009). 
6 Etty Hillesum, Etty: The Letters and Diaries of Etty Hillesum 1941–1943, ed. Klaas 
A.D. Smelik, transl. A.J. Pomerans (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2002), 488.  
7 Ibid., 506. 
8 Ibid., 657. 




At this point I differentiate between harms and suffering caused by acts by freely-
choosing self-conscious agents (usually called ‘moral evil’) and other harms and 
sufferings (‘natural evil’). I am not suggesting that any given human action is 
completely free. I acknowledge how much of our activity results from our 
neurological wiring and our familial and cultural conditioning. I also acknowledge that 
our self-consciousness is likewise limited and conditioned. I nevertheless hold that 
human experience suggests compellingly that within those constraints is a real if 
partial freedom, and that the scientific evidence does not rule that out.9  
I write this as the first anniversary of the terrorist attack on a concert in Manchester is 
rapidly followed by that of the further terrorist attack on London Bridge and Borough 
Market, and then by that of the terrible fire in Grenfell Tower. Two of these events 
clearly demonstrated malice, indeed the intention to harm those completely unknown 
to the perpetrators. There is substantial evidence that the extent and horror of 
Grenfell reflected not only an accidental start to the fire, but a negligent approach to 
the building, especially the external cladding of the tower. 
When we contemplate such harm-infliction and negligence caused by humans, I hold 
that we cannot expect to see signs of God in those causes. God gave the humans 
concerned freedom, and the causes of the harms and suffering were to be found in 
the misuse of that freedom. I return later to the question of signs of God in natural 
disasters.  
Ruard Ganzevoort is surely right to draw an important distinction between responses 
to malicious action on the one hand, and to events that seem rather to connote 
tragedy on the other, including harmful actions committed without intent to harm.10 
This distinction is necessary for healthy response to a traumatising event, as is 
eventual separation from the event, so that the victims no longer derive their identity 
solely from it. It does not however seem to me that Ganzevoort has quite addressed 
that other category of moral evil – negligent action or inaction, which while having no 
direct intent to harm is nevertheless culpable, and can and should provoke powerful 
protest from victims and supporters. 
 
9 For a painstaking analysis giving the scientific account the utmost purchase, see 
Philip Clayton, In Quest of Freedom: The Emergence of Spirit in the Natural World: 
Frankfurt Templeton Lectures 2006, ed. M. G. Parker and T. M. Schmidt (Göttingen: 
Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 2009). 
10 R. Ganzevoort, ‘Coping with Tragedy and Malice’ in Coping with evil in religion 
and culture ed. N. van Doorn-Harder and L. Minnema (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2008), 
247-60; ‘Scars and Stigmata: trauma, identity and theology’, Practical Theology 1,1 
(2008):19-31. 
Response to traumatising events within a Christian community caused by malice or 
negligence may reasonably include worship of God, protest, lament, and practical 
assistance. This is indeed the same combination of responses as would be elicited 
by a natural disaster. But the balance of the response must be different in the case 
of moral evil. The dominant dimension of response to moral evil must be making the 
community safe against further perpetrators, protest against all injustice and culpable 
negligence, rejection of all gratuitous harming, followed ultimately, when possible, by 
the exploration of the possibility of reconciliation. But always the victims and their 
narratives must be attended to, always, as is proverbial in trauma theory, ‘the 
survivor is the expert’. Arguably, theodicy has been much too preoccupied with the 
stories of the causes of great harm and suffering. The stories of victims and their 
supporters are coming to be recognised as of prime importance. So, remarkably, the 
public enquiry into the Grenfell fire began with days of testimony from survivors and 
relatives of victims (two importantly different groups in the immediate aftermath of a 
tragedy, but brought together at the enquiry in a common act of re-telling).  
Caution needs to be exercised, however, in fastening too firmly onto these stories, 
both because of the very fluid character of narratives of recollection in trauma,11 and 
also because of the risk of scapegoating. Here the analysis of Hauerwas and Burrell 
as to what constitute ‘good’ stories is helpful.12 They claim that any story that is 
adopted by a community will have to display: 1) power to release from destructive 
alternatives 2) ways of seeing through current distortions 3) room to keep the 
community from having to resort to violence and 4) a sense of the tragic – how 
meaning transcends power. I return to these criteria later.  
Where perpetrators (and the negligent) are culpable, the protest and desire for 
justice may eventually lead to an effort to reach for   the sort of love and empathy 
that Jesus is recorded as evinced when he said of his executioners, perpetrators of 
wicked acts that ‘they know not what they do’ (Lk 23.34). Even the enemy is to be 
loved as fellow-creature, in imitation of God’s love that never lets the creature go. 
But reaching anything like that position is a long labour of love, which perhaps few 
may attain. Sometimes a ‘staged’ version of reconciliation may be necessary, as in 
the work of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa after the 
apartheid era. 
Natural evil 
What will concern us in the rest of this essay are those shocking events where the 
main cause is not human malice, or human negligence, or even a very rare 
combination of chances, but the fabric of the physical universe as God has created 
and sustained it. A familiar defence of God in respect of moral evil is that the gift of 
 
11 Especially in the ‘disillusionment’ phase, see Laurie Kraus, David Holyan, and 
Bruce Wisner, Re-covering from Un-natural Disasters: a Guide for Pastors and 
Congregations after Violence and Trauma (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox 
Press, 2017), Ch 4. 
12 Stanley Hauerwas and David Burrell, ‘From System to Story: An Alternative 
Patttern for Rationality in Ethics’ in Why Narrative? ed. Stanley Hauerwas and L. 
Gregory Jones (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1989), 158-90. 
freedom to freely-choosing creatures conscious of themselves and others 
necessarily implies the possibility of the misuse of that freedom (and that, as was 
noted in the quotation from Rowan Williams above, God would render that gift 
incoherent by continually intervening to mitigate bad human choices). In the case of 
shock events occasioned by the way the world is, rather than the particular choices 
of conscious choosers, that defence can no longer operate in quite the same way.13 
God seems rather to be directly responsible for the creation containing the violence 
of earthquakes, hurricanes, forest fires caused by lightning strikes, flash-floods, and 
volcanic eruptions.14 
Some scholars want to insist on denying this responsibility of God’s. For discussion 
of theological moves behind such denial, either in the form of a fall-event or some 
variety of what I have termed ‘mysterious fallenness’, and my reservations about 
such moves, see the exchanges in the journal Zygon for September 2018.15 But 
there are also more practical denials such as that of Robert White.16 It is indeed 
possible, as White holds, to identify areas of human hubris and negligence 
contributing to the extent of suffering from natural disasters. For example, the loss of 
life from the Indian Ocean tsunami of 2004 was exacerbated by a civil war, the 
cutting down of mangrove swamps on coastland, and the lack of the early-warning 
system that was already present in the Pacific. The suffering caused by the Haiti 
earthquake of 2010 was greatly enhanced by the poverty of a country that is a close 
neighbour of the world’s wealthiest nation. Yet to exclude God from all responsibility 
for natural evil is a hard task. (What for example about that famous case in the 
history of theodicy – the Lisbon earthquake and tsunami of 1755, of which there 
 
13 Though see Christopher Southgate, “’Free-Process’ and ‘Only-Way’ Arguments.” 
in Finding Ourselves after Darwin: Conversations on the Image of God, Original Sin, 
and the Problem of Evil edited by Stanley P. Rosenberg, Michael Burdett, Michael 
Lloyd, and Benno van den Toren (Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos Press, 2018), 293-305, 
for an evaluation of those theodicies that appeal to the good of freedom of natural 
processes.  
14  B. Jill Carroll, writing of the work of the nature-contemplative Annie Dillard, goes 
as far as to say this: ‘It is because of the conditions of human existence in the world 
– conditions which have God’s full blessing – that people suffer what they like to call 
“freak accidents.” In truth, there is no freak accident, because such accidents are 
inevitable given the conditions of time, space, matter and freedom.’ B. Jill Carroll, 
The Savage Side: Reclaiming Violent Models of God (Lanham, Md. and Oxford: 
Rowman and Littlefield, 2001), 45. 
15 Neil Messer, “Evolution and Theodicy: How (Not) to Do Science and Theology.’ 
Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science 53 (2018):       ; Nicola Hoggard Creegan, 
“Theodicy: A Response to Christopher Southgate.” Zygon: Journal of Religion and 
Science 53 (2018):        ; Celia Deane-Drummond, “Perceiving Natural Evil through 
the Lens of Divine Glory? A Conversation with Christopher Southgate.” Zygon: 
Journal of Religion and Science 53 (2018):       ; Christopher Southgate, ‘Response 
with a Select Bibliography’, Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science 53 (2018):    
     
16 Robert S. White, Who is to Blame: Disasters, Nature and Acts of God (Oxford: 
Monarch, 2014). 
could have been no possible warning? Are we to return to Charles Wesley’s view, 
five years earlier, when he began a sermon with the statement that ‘Of all the 
Judgments which the righteous God inflicts on Sinners here, the most dreadful and 
destructive is an Earthquake’. 17 In the end, diversion of all culpability for catastrophic 
natural events from God to humans can only rest on a prior theological commitment 
to radical human corruption resulting from primal sin. On such a view, even a young 
baby falls rightly under divine judgment. It seems much more natural to concede that 
God has underlying responsibility for the way the violent processes of the world 
occasion human suffering.18 
So we now find ourselves beginning to answer our starting question - about God’s 
involvement in the shocking event - with the disturbing thought that God is the major 
responsible agent, the creator of the forces behind the most harm-producing 
manifestations of nature, be they floods, eruptions, typhoons, genetic diseases, or 
epidemics of natural pathogens. Christian theology has been very shy of this 
conclusion, though it is in a way a logical route to follow once Marcion’s distinction 
between the Gods of the two Testaments is abandoned, and creatio ex nihilo 
becomes the orthodoxy of the Church.  
Wesley Wildman has tackled this subject with characteristic clarity. He gives a skilful 
critique of ‘determinate-entity theism’ (belief in a personal God, such as the Christian 
conviction that God is creator and redeemer and can be known through God’s Son 
and the work of the Holy Spirit), and goes on to show the weaknesses of process 
theism. Wildman’s solution is to regard God as the ground of being, whose nature is 
glimpsable in the beauty but also in the violence of the cosmos. His God is not a 
determinate entity in all or indeed in most respects. Wildman writes, 
‘Suffering in nature is neither evil nor a by-product of the good. It is part of the 
wellspring of divine creativity in nature, flowing up out of the abysmal divine 
depths like molten rock from the yawning mouth of a volcano… Luminescent 
creativity and abysmal suffering are co-primal in the divine nature as they are 
in our experience.19  
 
17 Charles Wesley, quoted in Ryan Nichols, ‘Re-evaluating the Effects of the1755 
Lisbon Earthquake on Eighteenth-Century Minds: How Cognitive Science of Religion 
Improves Intellectual History with Hypothesis Testing Methods’, J. Am. Acad. Rel. 
82, 4 (2014):970-1009. 
18 And also non-human suffering in wild nature, see e.g. Christopher Southgate, The 
Groaning of Creation: God, Evolution and the Problem of Evil (Louisville, KY: 
Westminster John Knox Press, 2008). 
19 Wesley J. Wildman, ‘Incongruous Goodness, Perilous Beauty, Disconcerting 
Truth: Ultimate Reality and Suffering in Nature’ in Physics and Cosmology: Scientific 
Perspectives on the Problem of Natural Evil, ed. N. Murphy, R. J. Russell, and W. R. 
Stoeger, SJ (Berkeley, CA: CTNS and Vatican City: Vatican Observatory, 2007), 
267–94, at  294. See also Wesley J. Wildman, In our Own Image: 
But this will be too big a step for most Christians, who will want to insist, even in this 
difficult territory, on the personal nature of God, revealed especially in the person of 
Jesus. How to combine this with God’s accountability for the disvalues of creation? 
Veli-Matti Karkkainen, reporting on the Finnish school of Lutheran studies, writes this 
of the thought of Luther: 
God’s alien work [opus alienum Dei] means putting down, killing, taking away 
hope, leading to desperation, etc. God’s proper work means the opposite: 
forgiving, giving mercy, taking up, saving, encouraging, etc… Luther in fact 
says that God’s proper work is veiled in his alien work and takes place 
simultaneously with it… God’s works are not just veiled in their opposite but 
they also sometimes create bad results… God makes a human being a nihil 
… to make him/her a new being.20 
Karkkainen concludes finally that, ‘God is not to be excused, but is to be trusted.’21 
So there is thinking from a major element of the Christian tradition that accepts 
God’s responsibility for the violence in creation as part of the paradox of God’s ways 
with the world. The key element in that last quotation is that second half ‘but is to be 
trusted’.  
This is surprisingly close to a famous passage in contemporary Jewish theology, 
from David Blumenthal’s book on Holocaust theology, Facing the Abusing God. In 
the extraordinary coda to that book he writes to God as follows: 
I do not deny You or Your Torah. You denied us, for we were innocent. You 
crushed us, yet we were guiltless. You were the Abuser; our sins were not 
commensurate with Your actions. The responsibility is Yours, not ours . . . In 
spite of all this, we will gather our strength and support one another. We will 
build our world. We will love one another. We will defend our people and our 
land. We will believe in You, we will place our hope in You. We will yearn for 
You, we will wait for You, and we will anticipate the time when we will see 
Your Face again.22 
 
Anthropomorphism, Apophaticism and Ultimacy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2017). 
20 Veli-Matti Karkkainen, ‘ ‘Evil, Love and the Left Hand of God’: The Contribution of 
Luther’s Theology of the Cross to an Evangelical Theology of Evil’, Evangelical 
Quarterly 74:3 (2002): 215-34, at 222-3. On the ‘violent side of God’ in Christian 
reflection see also Carroll, Savage Side; Charlene P.E. Burns, ‘Honesty about God: 
Theological Reflections on Violence in an Evolutionary Universe’, Theology and 
Science, 4, 3, (2006):279-90. 
 
21 Karkkainen, ‘Evil’, 232. 
22 David R. Blumenthal, Facing the Abusing God: A Theology of Protest (Louisville, 
KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1993), 299. 
As with Karkkainen’s conclusion about the theology of Luther, God is not excused 
(rather the reverse!) but in spite of all, God is the one in whom ultimate trust will be 
placed.  
Blumenthal is addressing the extreme moral evil of the Holocaust. It draws from him, 
very understandably, a conviction that God’s apparent abandonment of the chosen 
people of God amounts to abuse. This conviction, and Blumenthal’s analogy with 
child abuse, have been much criticised, not least by Wendy Farley in her dialogue 
with the author within Facing the Abusing God.23 And it may also be criticised for 
blurring the distinction noted above between malice and negligence. God did not, on 
most accounts, actually commit the moral evils of the Holocaust, though God did not, 
apparently, intervene to prevent or even mitigate them. Hence the responses of 
Wiesel and Williams with which we began this chapter.  
 
Our subject here is possible Christian responses to events of massive natural evil, 
causing great harm and suffering through the operation of causes that God created, 
and which did not operate through the choices of other moral agents. The response 
of holding God accountable, I suggest, is truer to the origins of Judaism and 
Christianity than either the hyperkenotic position of Jonas or the powerless power of 
Etty Hillesum’s God, whom she could still call her ‘high tower’,24 even though that 
God not only would not, but could not, rescue her from oppression or execution. I 
also hold that a God accountable for natural evil is truer to a biblical faith than 
philosophical theodicies that ‘square the circle’ of God’s moral perfection and God’s 
involvement in harms and suffering.25 The shortcomings of such theodicies have 
been corrosively analysed by Terrence Tilley and D.Z. Phillips,26 and also by 
Kenneth Surin, with his emphasis that we must allow the narratives of victims to 
interrupt the narratives we tell, and John Swinton, with his sense that the proper 
 
23 Blumenthal, Facing. 211-25. See also for example J. Brumberg-Kraus, 
‘Contemporary Jewish Theologies: An Essay Review’, The Reconstructionist 
(Spring) 1994:86-94; I. Wollaston, ‘The Possibility and Plausibility of Divine 
Abusiveness or Sadism as the Premise for a Religious Response to the Holocaust’, 
J. Religion and Society 2 (2000): 1-15.  
24 Quoting Psalm 94.22, or possibly 18.2, or 61.3, or Proverbs 18.10? Denise de 
Costa notes that Etty on this postcard used the Dutch word vertrek, which can 
connote ‘departure’, or yet ‘retreat’, an interesting ambiguity indeed. Denise de 
Costa, Anne Frank and Etty Hillesum: Inscribing Spirituality and Sexuality, transl. M. 
F. C. Hoyinck and R. E. Chesal (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 
1998), 237. 
25 Such as Richard Swinburne, Providence and the Problem of Evil (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1998); Alvin Plantinga, God, Freedom and Evil (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Eerdmans, 1977). 
26 Terrence Tilley, The Evils of Theodicy (Georgetown, VA., Georgetown University 
Press, 1991); D.Z. Phillips, The Problem of Evil and the Problem of God (London, 
SCM Press, 2004). 
response to suffering is found not in theory but in lament, forgiveness, 
thoughtfulness, hospitality, and friendship.27 
 
Is there then an approach that retains the personal character of God, contra 
Wildman, without seeking either to exonerate God as per White, or yet to 
characterise God as ‘abuser’ as per Blumenthal?  
 
That God might be the author of suffering is familiar ground in the Hebrew Bible, and 
Christians need I believe to take with more seriousness texts such as Deuteronomy’s 
‘See now that I, even I, am he; there is no god besides me. I kill and I make alive; I 
wound and I heal; and no one can deliver from my hand.’ (Deut 32.39), 
‘The Lord kills and brings to life; he brings down to Sheol and raises up.’ (1. Sam. 
2.6) and Deutero-Isaiah’s description of God as the author of ‘weal and woe alike’ 
(Is. 45.7).28   
  
The extraordinary power of Blumenthal’s paragraph quoted above lies in that ‘In 
spite of all this….’ It is reminiscent of Samuel Terrien’s formulation of Israel’s 
relationship with her Lord, written in the context of the story of the near-sacrifice of 
Isaac: ‘The sign of purity of faith was love at any cost for a God who conceals his 
Godhead in appearance of hostility.’ Israel’s religion, then, is ‘based on the courage 
to face the abyss of being, even the abyss of the being of God, and to affirm . . . the 
will to gamble away not only one’s own ego but even one’s hope in the future of 
mankind’.29  
 
This conclusion about the God of the Hebrew Bible theophanies is too much tidied 
up in too many Christian preachers’ accounts of God’s ways with the world. 
Karkkainen again: ‘Much of Evangelical spirituality and theology, especially in its 
popular, devotional form, is a misguided effort in whitewashing the walls of our world 
with sentimental talk about God’s love.’30 
 
I suggest that recognising God’s responsibility for natural evil counts as a helpful 
story in Hauerwas and Burrell’s terms because: 1) it releases us from destructive 
alternatives, whether they be that humans are so utterly corrupt that even a newborn 
baby deserves destruction, or that blame must be assigned to human groups judged 
especially immoral31 (and so also keeps us from having to resort to violence) 2) it 
 
27 Kenneth Surin, Theology and the Problem of Evil (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1986), 
161-2; John Swinton, Raging with Compassion: pastoral responses to the problem of 
evil (Grand Rapids, MI. and Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2007), xxx. 
28 See M. Daniel Carroll R. and J. Blair Wilgus (eds), Wrestling with the Violence of 
God: Soundings in the Old Testament (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2015) for 
recent engagement with these and other problematic texts. 
29 Samuel Terrien, The Elusive Presence: Toward a New Biblical Theology (Eugene, 
OR: Wipf and Stock, 2005 [1978]), 83-4. 
30 Karkkainen, ‘Evil’, 231. 
31 As in the extraordinary assertion in a flyer from an American Baptist Church that 
the 2004 tsunami had done a good, in resulting in the deaths of many Swedish 
people in Thailand, because of the extent of homosexuality in Sweden. ‘Tsunami: 
provides us with ways of seeing through current distortions, such as the sentimental 
whitewashing just referred to, and finally 3) it enhances our sense of the tragic – 
neither humanity, nor even God, seems to have the power to realise certain sorts of 
goods except through suffering. 
 
So we must be honest, banishing sentimentality and the temptation to whitewash, in 
acknowledging God’s responsibility for the violent and harm-ful character of the 
natural world. For both Frances Young and myself, the Incarnation of Jesus, God’s 
astonishingly intensified commitment to the world, culminating in the Cross, is God’s 
taking responsibility for the suffering-filled world.32 Perhaps this is for Christians the 
beginning of the framing of an ‘In spite of all this’ that is the sequel to the chronicle of 
God’s complex relationship with the people of God in the Hebrew Bible. 
 
I want to consider how a Christian community that had undergone terrible suffering 
might rewrite the second half of Blumenthal’s remarkable paragraph. This is not in 
any way to seek to detract from the horror of the Holocaust (and the particular horror 
for Christians that it was perpetrated by a nation with a strong Christian tradition), or 
yet to seek to detract from the force, authenticity or importance of Jewish 
formulations of relationship with God.  
 
But it is possible to imagine Christian communities too feeling let down, abandoned, 
neglected, if not positively abused by, sufferings from natural disaster, sufferings for 
which God seems principally responsible, and by God’s seeming failure to respond 
to the extremity of their situation, by, in short, a God who seems at once so powerful 
and powerless. 
 
It is of course possible to frame theodicies of natural evil, and I have been part of 
extensive conversations about these.33 Sitting in a university study it is easy to 
pronounce, for example, that a world of tectonic activity, a world therefore of 
earthquakes, volcanoes, and tsunamis is a world in which many processes that 
enhance living organisms are made possible. But in the face of the experience of 
disaster such long-distance, on-balance reflections look out of place, if not positively 
offensive.34  
 
In more recent work I have considered God’s involvement in natural evil from the 
standpoint of the contemplation of divine glory.35 There I propose that God’s glory is 
typically best understood as a visible sign of the deep reality of God. In the natural 
 
where was God?’ (director Mark Dowd, broadcast by Channel 4 and available on 
YouTube).  
32 Frances Young, God’s Presence: A Contemporary Recapitulation of Early 
Christianity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 247; Southgate, 
Groaning, 83. 
33 See e.g. Southgate, Groaning; ‘Free-Process’; Christopher Southgate, ‘Cosmic 
Evolution and Evil’ in The Cambridge Companion to the Problem of Evil, ed. C. 
Meister and P. K. Moser (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 147–64.  
34 On the offence of theodicy see e.g. Tilley, Evils. 
35 Christopher Southgate, Theology in a Suffering World: Glory and Longing 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019). 
world the massive power of physical forces,36 the skill of predators, and even the 
ingenuity of parasites can all be considered signs of the creative work of God.37 As 
we have just been discussing, the signs of God’s creative activity in the natural world 
include forces of great violence and capacity to cause harm, and also ingenious 
pathogenic strategies that can likewise occasion great suffering. Hints here of what 
for Luther is the opus alienum Dei? 
 
But that is not the whole story of God with the world. I argue that a full contemplation 
of events in the natural world, with all their violence and ambiguity, involves what I 
term ‘three-lensed seeing’.38 By this I mean the need to consider every event in 
relation to Gloria mundi, signs in the creation of the creative activity of God, Gloria 
crucis, signs associated with God’s self-giving in the Passion and death of Christ, 
and Gloria in excelsis, God’s bringing of all of creation to consummation.  
Such seeing will involve attending carefully to the experience of the sufferers of 
natural evil, as Surin urges,39 and allowing that experience to interact with 
convictions about God’s taking responsibility for all suffering at the Cross of Christ. It 
will involve protest and lament, as Swinton suggests.40 It will involve seeing the 
extraordinary gift in creation that is human life, and holding on also to the belief that 
God holds out a future for God’s creatures, including those that have died in terrible 
suffering.41 
Blumenthal himself advocates a strategy of ‘tacking’.42 By this he means advancing 
not wholly directly into the challenges of life, now prioritising reason, now spiritual 
practice, now the insights of the arts. ‘One tack in our lives is to confront what we 
would rather avoid, with as much courage as we can muster.’43 Given the content of 
the rest of his book, this must include facing up to the blameworthiness of God, and 
finding the language for that, as well as for praise and hope. Three-lensed seeing 
endeavours to be more ‘synoptic’ than a strategy involving tacking between blame, 
lament and praise. That perhaps makes it more theologically acceptable than 
Blumenthal’s characterisation of the ‘abusing’ God, though at the risk of taking the 
edge off the radical character of the protest at God that is so important in the Jewish 
tradition, especially deriving from the Psalms and the Book of Job.  
This three-lensed seeing, this bringing of the whole story of God’s ways with the 
world into every event, however shocking and full of harm, finds for Christians (or 
should find) its outward expression in the actions of the eucharist. There everything 
that has happened to the participants and the context of which they are a part is 
 
36 The tectonic slippage that caused the Indian Ocean tsunami is estimated to have 
had 23,000 times the energy of the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima. 
37 Southgate, Theology, Ch 3. 
38 Southgate, Theology, 14-15. 
39 Surin, Theology, Ch 5. 
40 Swinton, Raging 
41 Southgate, Groaning, Ch 5. 
42 Blumenthal, Facing, Chapter 5. 
43 Ibid, 54. 
brought to God, and interacts with the threefold narrative structure of creation, Cross 
and eschaton. Stephen Garrett writes: 
our performance of the eucharist serves to triangulate our actions in the 
present as we live in the presence of the risen Christ in the Spirit with 
reference to redemptive history yet in light of his eschatological glory. A robust 
imagination is necessary to integrate our remembering and envisaging – what 
was with what is and is to come, bringing a sense of meaning and 
understanding to the present so we can participate fittingly and creatively in 
the dramatic movements of God’s triune life44  
That the eucharist can be intensely meaningful in traumatising contexts is confirmed 
by the recent experience of Alan Everett, parish priest at St Clements near Grenfell 
Tower.45 But is there a danger that some eucharistic practice may seem to some 
people all much too neat? Is there a risk that the tripartite story there enacted, of 
creation, reconciliation through the Passion, and eschatological hope may too readily 
tidy up the rawness and agony of human suffering in time of disaster? Does the 
eucharist as usually practised, with its emphasis on the redemption of human sin, 
provide sufficient opportunity to ‘pray angry’ at God’s involvement in suffering?46 
Robert Orsi writes this of ‘Frank’, a Catholic priest who had suffered sexual abuse at 
the hands of priests: 
Frank’s theodicy of praying angry directly addresses this reality. “What more 
can God do to you?” he says. To have seen God at God’s worst is to be 
liberated from the old relationship with an omnipotent God, and this opens a 
way for a new relationship. Survivors are free not only to express their doubts, 
their sense of betrayal, and their anger with God, but also to consider the 
articulation of these feelings as prayer. There is a hard edge to Frank’s 
theodicy of prayer. Survivors have got God’s number; they meet God without 
illusions about God. But this does not drive them away from God, or it need 
not do so in Frank’s theology. Rather, it permits them to pray fearlessly and 
freely, to pray as they really are as persons, to open their inner lives in all their 
turmoil and anger to God who must take them as they are…  
 
So Frank invites survivors not to resolve their problems with “prayer,” but 
instead to see what is unresolvable as prayer itself. This refusal of closure 
restores the tension… between persons praying and the divine other. Praying 
angry is the medium of this new relationship with God, its ground, and its 
safeguard.47 
 
44 Stephen L. Garrett, God’s Beauty-in-Act: Participation in God’s Suffering Glory 
(Eugene, OR: Pickwick Books, 2013), 192, emphasis in the original. 
45 Alan Everett, After the Fire: finding words for Grenfell (Norwich: Canterbury Press, 
2018) 
46 Robert Orsi, ‘Praying Angry’ at http://forums.ssrc.org/ndsp/2013/08/27/praying-
angry accessed July 20 2018. 
47 Ibid. 
 
While sexual abuse poses very particular challenges in terms of prayer and liturgy, 
explored by Carla Grosch-Miller in this volume, some of these reactions could well 
apply to communities devastated by natural disaster. They too may have the feeling 
that they ‘have seen God at God’s worst’. They too need to be able to ‘pray angry’ 
and not to accept premature closure.  
 
One might imagine a eucharist in such a community lasting many hours, and 
containing a long vigil and time of lament. Such eucharistic practice would find room 
not only for Jesus’ words over bread and wine at the Last Supper - words not 
necessarily uttered in calm certainty, but rather torn from him as the beginning of his 
agony – but also for his prayer in Gethsemane, his own ‘In spite of all this’ 
acceptance of the future mapped out for him by God. Such  eucharists might also 
provide a way in which the dynamic of Good Friday leading not directly to Easter 
Sunday but first to Holy Saturday, identified both by Shelly Rambo and by Jennifer 
Baldwin as the moment in the Christian year most in tune with the experience of 
survivors of trauma, might find expression.48  
 
The vigil and lament, times of silence and praying angry, might be followed by music 
inspired by Christ’s Passion, and in turn by a eucharistic prayer that included a 
sense of God’s taking responsibility for the suffering-filled world God has made. The 
invitation to communion would recognise that it might take a long time for someone 
to be ready to accept God’s gift of Christ’s body and blood, and that for others it 
might on that occasion be impossible to accept the ‘staged reconciliation’ with God 
that taking communion would symbolise. To return to Garrett’s helpful formulation 
quoted above, the integration of ‘remembering and envisaging’ may come at different 
rates for different people, not because some possess more ‘robust imagination’ than 
others, but because the histories of trauma that we each bear as humans interact 
differently with present sufferings and future hopes. It would be important that those 
who could not receive were still held by the community as full members. 
The theme of eucharist in relation to trauma is further explored in the work of Karen 
O’Donnell (see her chapter in this volume). What I advocate here is that the use of 
the eucharist in traumatised congregations, especially those where the ‘perpetrator’ 
is God in Godself, is not rendered too tidy, but that its full possibilities for holding a 
space of pain and anger are explored. 
I began the second half of this chapter from that remarkable (and to some extent 
notorious) paragraph of Blumenthal’s at the end of Facing the Abusing God. I posed 
the question as to how a Christian community, devastated by a natural disaster, 
might frame the second part of that paragraph, the ‘In spite of all this’. 




48  Shelly Rambo, Spirit and Trauma: A Theology of Remaining (Louisville, KY: 
Westminster John Knox Press, 2010); Jennifer Baldwin, ‘Injured but not broken: 
Constructing a Trauma Sensitive Theology’, (Ph.D. dissertation, Lutheran School of 
Theology, Chicago, 2013).             
You God, made the great forces that have destroyed our homes, our 
livelihoods, and taken from us those we held dear. You did not warn us of 
disaster; you did not have regard to all our prayers and worship. We know of 
your loving-kindness from both Testaments of our Scriptures, but we have not 
felt it. Though we sought to bless you, our lives are broken.  
 
In spite of all this, we will pray for Your comfort and mercy. We will use the 
life, passion and resurrection of Jesus as our clue to what life with You might 
ultimately be. We will believe in You because of Him, we will place our hope in 
You because of Him. Though His care could show partiality,49 and His 
teaching an almost unbearable sternness,50 yet because of His life and His 
Passion we will yearn for Him, groaning prayerfully within the greater groans 
of the Holy Spirit.51 We will wait for the Christ’s return, and we will anticipate 
the time when we will see You in His risen glory. We will love one another and 
seek even to love the enemy. We will seek to build Your Kingdom as He 
described it. 
 
This is a radical formulation, and most Christian experience will, I suggest, lie 
between this and the all-too-common whitewashing of experience found in so much 
worship and preaching. But I suggest that this paradoxical prayer has wider 
application than only to communities shocked by sudden natural disaster. Every 
Christian community contains those subject to sudden tragedy, unexpected or long 
dreaded, explicable through understood causes, or simply mysterious. Perhaps it is 
time that some Christian liturgies were constructed more along these lines, and 
Christian hymnody diversified to inhabit more of the territory so importantly marked 
out by the Psalms. 
 
In this chapter I have considered God’s involvement in horrific events, both those 
caused by moral evils – either malicious or arising out of negligence – and those 
natural evils in which God is the principal cause of the harms and suffering. I drew on 
resources from both the Christian tradition and contemporary Jewish theology to 
imagine what responses might be made by Christian communities faced with such 
natural disasters, both in terms of prayer and liturgy. My conclusion is that reflection 
on the impact of traumatising events, and honest, unsentimental reflection on God’s 
ways with the world, should lead not only to a richer vein of Christian contemplation, 
but also to radical and paradoxical answers to the question as what should be 







49 As at the story of the Syrophoenician woman at Mark 7.24-30. 
50 As for example in the teaching on faith dividing families at Matthew 10.35-36. 
51 Rom. 8.23-27. 
